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Abstract 
Purpose- In this study, we test the so-called ‘Quiet Life Hypothesis’ (QLH) which postulates 
that banks with market power are less efficient. 
 
Design/methodology/approach- We employ instrumental variable Ordinary Least Squares, 
Fixed Effects, Tobit and Logistic regressions. The empirical evidence is based on a panel of 162 
banks consisting of 42 African countries for the period 2001-2011. There is a two-step analytical 
procedure. First, we estimate Lerner indices and cost efficiency scores. Then, we regress cost 
efficiency scores on Lerner indices contingent on bank characteristics, market features and the 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
Findings- The empirical evidence does not support the QLH because market power is positively 
associated with cost efficiency.  
 
Originality/value- Owing to data availability constraints, this is one of the few studies to test the 
QLH in African banking.  
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JEL Classification : E42, E52, E58, G21, G28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
1. Introduction 
In a scenario where market participants possess substantial market power in the setting of market 
prices, neoclassical theory predicts that such participants (e.g. financial institutions) can set 
prices above corresponding marginal costs so as to increase profits as much as possible (Koetter 
& Vins, 2008). Such a phenomenon of maximizing idiosyncratic profits instead of increasing 
market access to specific commodities is known as ‘quiet life’ and investigated within the 
framework of a ‘Quiet Life Hypothesis’ (QLH)2. From the perspective of the banking sector, the 
QLH is likely when competition is low as large banks are not incentivized to be cost efficient 
and widen financial access. Such a hypothesis is of scholarly and policy relevance in Africa for 
three main reasons. They are: (i) the substantially documented surplus liquidity concerns in 
African financial institutions (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009; Asongu, 2014, p.70); (ii) a recent 
stream of literature proposing that some financial institutions in Africa may be enjoying a ‘quiet 
life’ and abusing their market privileges (Boateng et al., 2018; Asongu et al., 2016a) and (iii) 
shortcomings in the existing literature. In principle, the literature is consistent with the view that 
small sized institutions have lower interest margins compared to their larger counterparts (Beck 
& Hesse, 2006; Ahokpossi, 2013). For example, it has been established that: (i) large banks 
influence interest rate charges within the financial sector; (ii) big financial institutions are 
connected with more expensive loans (Ngigi, 2013a, 2013b) and (iii) policies that favour 
competition in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) enhance financial access by decreasing loan price 
(Ahokpossi, 2013).  
 From a theoretical viewpoint (Asongu et al., 2018, 2019a), large financial institutions 
which are endowed with high market power should reflect lower margins in interest rates 
because they are associated with positive externalities like internal and external economies of 
scale. However, for the past decades, big banks have been documented to be associated with less 
financial allocation efficiency (Mitchell & Onvural, 1996; Boateng et al., 2018). There are three 
main perspectives in the literature that elucidate this paradox between big banks and financial 
efficiency. Firstly, big financial institutions may use information sharing offices (like public 
credit registries and private credit bureaus) to reduce transaction costs with associated increase in 
their profit margins (Brown & Zehnder, 2010; Asongu et al., 2016b). Secondly, large banks can 
also be linked with diseconomies of scale: a phenomenon that can be allied with inefficiencies in 
                         
2
 The Quiet Life Hypothesis (QLH) is an assumption that financial institutions with substantial market power may 
allocate less investment to enhance financial access by means of intermediation efficiency. According to the 
hypothesis, instead of using their favourable market position to boost loan quantity and/or reduce the price of loans, 
these financial institutions tend to exploit such ‘market power’ to improve their gains or enjoy a ‘quiet life’ 
(Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010). 
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terms of management, organisation and coordination (Karray & Chichti, 2013; Clark, 1996; 
Mester, 1992). Thirdly, large financial institutions could be managed with the objective of 
achieving advantages of ‘quiet life’ instead of leveraging on their privileged positions to increase 
financial efficiency (Mitchell & Onvural, 1996; Boateng et al., 2018).  This study is closest to 
the third perspective. Therefore, by assessing the QLH in terms of cost efficiency, we contribute 
to the literature by clarifying if big banks in Africa are cost efficient. 
 In the light of the above, this study complements a recent stream of the African financial 
literature that is grounded on assumptions that large financial institutions could be abusing their 
market powers (Barth et al., 2009; Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017). It is 
important to note that claims in these previous studies have primarily been based on inferences 
from anecdotal evidence rather than from direct empirical assessments. Our study directly deals 
with this concern from a cost efficiency perspective. It departs from Ariss (2010) (a study in 
Table 1 closest to this inquiry) by: (i) exclusively focusing on a continent where the worry of 
restricted financial access is most severe (Tchamyou, 2019a, 2019b; Tchamyou et al., 2019) and 
(ii) using a slightly more updated dataset. The latter point also enables the study to extend a 
recent stream of economic development literature that has used the same dataset (Asongu, 2017; 
Asongu & Biekpe, 2017). While Asongu (2017) examined the effect of lowering information 
costs on loan price and quantity in the African banking industry, Asongu and Biekpe (2017) 
investigated linkages between information asymmetry, information technology and market 
power in the African banking industry. Hence, the positioning of this study on market power and 
cost efficiency in the African banking industry, extends the argument in this recent stream of 
literature particularly with respect to the debate on market power as summarised in the Table 13.  
The rest of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 provides conceptual clarifications 
and the related literature while Section 3 discusses the data and methodology. The empirical 
results and corresponding discussion are covered in Section 4 whereas Section 5 outlines 
concluding remarks and future research directions.  
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 Moreover, a recent bulk of African financial development literature has failed to engage the dimension of market 
power (Fowowe, 2014; Chikalipah, 2017;  Daniel, 2017; Wale & Makina, 2017; Iyke & Odhiambo, 2017; Bocher et 
al., 2017; Chapoto & Aboagye, 2017; Osah & Kyobe, 2017;  Oben & Sakyi, 2017). 
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2. Conceptual clarifications and related literature  
2.1 Conceptual clarifications 
2.1.1 Bank size, market power and efficiency  
The literature on linkages between market power, bank size and efficiency is still open to much 
debate. Results from empirical studies, while subtle, are for the most part ambiguous on the 
underlying relationships among these three elements. This section is organised into two strands: 
(i) the linkage between bank size and efficiency and (ii) the relationship between efficiency and 
market power.  
 Firstly, from intuition, a positive nexus may be expected between bank size and cost 
efficiency because big banks are more likely to develop material, technical, human and financial 
resources that improve their use of inputs to generate outputs such as loans and other income 
generating assets. Along the same line of thinking, given that costs associated with 
intermediation and agency activities are more linked with larger firms, it can be expected that 
small banks are connected with considerably lower inefficiency scores. According to Berger and 
Mester (1997), as the size of a bank grows, it becomes more able to control costs, create higher 
income with related profits. This stance was shared by Srivastava (1999) who established 
evidence of higher average efficiencies for medium-sized banks, followed by large banks. The 
result that small financial institutions are the least efficient consolidates the perspective that the 
relationship is positively monotonic. Whereas to the best of our knowledge, there is no clear link 
between bank size and estimated efficiencies that have been documented (Fukuyama, 1993; 
Lang & Welzel, 1996; Altunbas et al., 2000; Karray & Chichti, 2013), the hypothesis that big 
banks  have higher levels of inefficiency has been respectively supported and rejected by Allen 
and Rai (1996) and Goldberg and Rai (1996).  
 
2.1.2 Economies of banking and efficiency  
 There are eight main banking economies which are regularly identified in the literature. 
They comprise (i) cost efficiency, (ii) revenue efficiency, (iii) captivity efficiency, (iv) 
concentration efficiency, (v) ‘X’-efficiency, (vi) scale efficiency and (vii) scope efficiency. For 
ease of exposition, these efficiency measurements are discussed under four main strands.  
Firstly, with regard to cost efficiency, increasing bank size has been acknowledged by 
many authors to bring cost reductions and economies of scale (Mitchell & Onvural, 1996; Karray 
& Chichti, 2013). This is principally because of the apparent absorption of fixed costs via large 
volumes, notably: information and communication technology, network, branding and regulatory 
costs. It is also important to balance this narrative with the position in the previous section 
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maintaining that the relationship between bank size and unit costs is also U-shaped. Furthermore, 
because large financial institutions operate with more complex and heavy technology, there may 
be limited avenues for economies of scale. 
 Secondly, according to De Keuleneer and Leszczynska (2012), the discussion on revenue 
efficiency is based on the assumption that efficiency is contingent on bank-specific features that 
are particularly related to the size of the bank. There are three main narratives motivating this 
strand. (i) Many enterprises employ financial institutions, irrespective of size if good services are 
offered by such firms. Therefore, the idea that big enterprises request substantial credit in order 
to deal with a financial institution is not always true. Moreover, the impression that such big 
corporations tend to deal for the most part with banks that are always loyal and profitable is also 
not always true. (ii) Whereas it might be posited that big international networks enable superior 
services, an appealing network of correspondence could offer services that are superior or even 
equivalent to the network of a proprietor with international branches. (iii) While better risk 
diversification is also articulated by advocates of big banks, diversification of risk can be 
obtained in a plethora of ways, notably, via various credit insurance channels and credit 
syndications.  
 Thirdly, consistent with De Keuleneer and Leszczynska (2012), captivity efficiency 
articulates the prospect of big continental financial institutions which focus on boosting their 
control over the distribution of financial commodities. Accordingly, while controlling their 
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directives (UCITS), they also 
underwrite a plethora of structured commodities which they distribute leaving little choice to the 
clients they claim to advise. In the process, little information is allowed for transparent 
competition. In essence, bank size is associated with an advantage in this kind of abuse.  
 Fourthly, the notion of concentration efficiency in the last strand is founded on the 
evidence that despite the absence of a relationship between bank size and efficiency or between 
profitability and bank size, many bankers still pursue size as an objective (De Keuleneer & 
Leszczynska, 2012). Therefore, it is proposed that relative size within a market is essential 
because increased profitability is highly correlated with market concentration. It follows that a 
higher degree of concentration enables financial institutions to charge higher margins that justify 
greater rewards for managers.  
 In the light of the above, there is a multitude of conceptions and definitions of efficiency. 
For instance, consistent with Wagenvoort and Schure (1999), when investigating efficiency, a 
researcher could be interested in one of the following three forms of efficiency: (i) X-efficiency 
(whether banks use their available inputs efficiency), (ii) scale efficiency (if banks produce the 
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right amount of outputs) and (iii) scope efficiency (whether banks choose an efficient 
combination of outputs). The discussion in this section is to articulate that while there are various 
measures of efficiency, the positioning of this study is on cost efficiency. 
 
2.1.3 Summary of empirical literature on the Quiet Life Hypothesis (QLH) 
As apparent in Table 1 below, the QLH has not been given the scholarly attention it 
deserves in the African continent, in spite of the region experiencing comparatively more severe 
problems in financial access (Triki & Gajigo, 2014). From the table, with the exception of Ariss 
(2010) who has included a few African countries, the bulk of the literature has not done so.  
 
Table 1: Summary of empirical literature 
Author(s) Regions (Period) Quiet Life Hypothesis(QLH) 
   
Tu & Chen (2000)  Taiwan (1986-1999) Yes 
   
Weill (2004) Europe (1994-1999) No 
   
Maudos & de Guevara (2007) Europe (1993-2002) No 
   
Koetter & Vins (2008) Germany (1996-2006) Yes 
   
Koetter et al. (2012) USA (1986-2006) Yes 
   
Pruteanu-Podpiera et al. (2008) Czech Republic (1994-2005)  No 
   
Schaeck & Cihak (2008) Europe & USA (1995-2005) Yes 
   
Al-Jarrah & Gharaibeh (2009) Jordan (2001-2005) No 
   
 
Solis & Maudos (2008)  
 
Mexico (1993-2005) 
No (for deposit market) 
Yes (for loans market) 
   
Al-Muharrami & Matthews (2009)  Arab Gulf (1993-2002) No 
   
Fan & Marton (2011) SEE  (1998-2008) No 
   
Fu & Heffernan (2009) China (1985-2002) No 
   
Delis & Tsionas (2009) Europe (1996-2006) Yes 
   
Fu & Heffernan (2009)  China (1985-2002) No 
   
Punt &van Rooij(2009) EU (1992-1997) No 
   
Ariss (2010) A sample of developing countries 
(1999-2005) 
Yes (cost efficiency) 
 No (profit efficiency) 
   
Coccorese & Pellecchia (2010) Italy (1992-2007) Yes 
   
Tetsushi et al. (2012) Japan (1974-2005) Yes 
   
Titko & Dauylbaev (2015) Baltic countries (2007-2013) No 
   
Sources: Coccorese and Pellecchia (2010); Titko and Dauylbaev (2015) and Author. SEE: South East European countries. EU: Europe Union. 
QLH: Quiet Life Hypothesis.  
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3. Methodology and Data 
3.1 Methodology 
3.1.1 Empirical estimation of cost efficiency and the Lerner index 
 In order to estimate time varying cost efficiency scores, the stochastic frontier model of  
Aigner-Lovell-Schmidt (1977) is employed in accordance with Coccorese and Pellecchia (2010).  
 Let us consider that for firm i  at time t , production costs are a function of output ( Q ), 
input prices (W ), inefficiency ( u ) and random error ( v ). With the last two terms independently 
and identically distributed (iid), the logarithmic specification of the cost function can be written 
as follows:
 
 
ititititit uvWQfC  ),(ln
                                  (1)     
where the error term and non-negative inefficiency terms follow a normal distribution and a 
truncated normal distribution respectively. Hence, while itv  is ²),0( vN  , itu  is ²),( uN  . 
Moreover itu  is modeled as a function of time as follows:       
  iiit Ttuu  (exp 
                                            (2) 
Hence, for firm i , the last period  iT contains the base level of its own inefficiency which is 
time-dynamic. In other words: if 0 , the level of inefficiency decays toward the base level 
(i.e. firm i  would have the tendency of improving its cost efficiency over time); if  0 , the 
firm’s inefficiency increases to the base level; while 0 means that inefficiency is constant 
with time. Since, iTt  , the last period for firm i contains the base level of inefficiency.
  
In   order to model the cost, we employ a translog function with three inputs and one output. The 
function first proposed by Christensen et al. (1971) and then extended to a multiproduct 
framework (Brown et al., 1979) has been substantially employed for the assessment of the QLH 
in the banking literature (Koetter & Vins, 2008; Coccorese  & Pellecchia, 2010; Ariss, 2010). 
The cost function is as follows:  

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                                             (3) 
where Ni ,........1  and  Tt .........1 , are subscripts for banks and time respectively.
 
C is the 
total cost,  Q , is the output, hW  are factor prices, while itv  and itu  are respectively the 
inefficiency and error terms. It is important to note that ititit uv  . 
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where itP  is the price charged by banks on their output. Accordingly, in theory the Lerner index 
can vary between 0 (in case of perfect competition) and 1.  It important to note that efficiency 
scores are obtained by estimating the Aigner-Lovell-Schmidt cost function and then generating 
cost efficiency scores (CES). The regression output pertaining to the cost function from which 
the CES are generated is provided in Appendix 4.  
 
3.1.2 Testing the ‘Quiet Life’ Hypothesis (QLH) 
 The QLH test is implemented for African financial institutions by regressing the CES on 
the estimated Lerner index (LERNER) contingent on a conditioning information set, consisting 
of: market-level, bank-level and fixed effects for the unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, a negative 
and statistically significant estimate of the variable corresponding to LERNER can be interpreted 
as evidence for the validity of the QLH. Given that CES are theoretically within the interval of 0 
and 1, estimation by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is not appropriate. This shortcoming has 
motivated many authors to employ double-censored Tobit specifications (Kumbhakar & Lovell, 
2000; Koetter et al., 2012; Ariss, 2010; Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010).  
In the light of the above, as recently argued by Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016), the 
Tobit model is appropriate when bounds on the outcome indicator originate from non-
observability. Moreover, as shown in recent literature (McDonald, 2009; Coccorese & 
Pellecchia, 2010), if no observations for the CES are either 0 or 1 (which is the case for the most 
part), estimating  by double-censored Tobit model is the same as analysing a linear regression 
model given that the two likelihood functions converge. Therefore, on the one hand, we use a 
Logistic regression (as an alternative to the non-linear approach), and on the other, we employ 
OLS and Fixed Effects (FE) regressions under the linear hypothesis. Thus, the alternative 
nonlinear (logistic) specification in Eq. (6) is the following:    
   itititit x
xCE 
  '
'
exp1
exp
                                                                              (6) 
where itx  is the same vector of regressors used in the Tobit model,  is the vector of parameters  
and it is an iid with mean zero and variance ² variance.  
Given a linear hypothesis, the corresponding FE regression is as follows: 
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itiitit nxCE  
                                                                                     (7) 
where i  and itn are the unobserved time-invariant individual effects and error term 
respectively.  In the absence of individual effects in the former, it becomes a constant and Eq. (7) 
can be estimated by OLS. 
 In order to address the potential issue of endogeneity that may arise, the Lerner index is 
instrumented with internal instruments or its first lags. This is essentially because the Lerner 
variable could be endogenous given that the efficiency structure (ES) hypothesis postulates a 
causal relation from efficiency to the market. The study employs an instrumental variable 
approach to control for the simultaneity dimension of endogeneity. Moreover, the unobserved 
heterogeneity dimension is controlled by accounting for dummy independent variables such as 
legal origins and income levels. The instrumental variable approach consists of regressing the 
independent variable of interest (i.e. the Lerner index) on its first and second lags while 
controlling for fixed effects and then saving the corresponding fitted values that are subsequently 
used as the independent variables of interest. Such an approach has been used in recent literature 
(Efobi et al., 2016; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017).  
   
3.1.3 Robustness checks and sensitivity analysis  
 The following checks are performed to ensure consistency in the results. (i) Two 
hypotheses (linear and nonlinear) underline the adopted estimation technique. (ii) Under each 
hypothesis, two estimation techniques are adopted (OLS and Fixed Effects for the linear 
hypothesis or Tobit and Logistic regressions for the nonlinear hypothesis). (iii) For each 
estimation technique, three specifications are considered. (iv) We control for both the 
unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity bias. (v) Modeling is based on Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors. 
 It is important to note that as like in Coccorese and Pellecchia (2010), in the robustness 
exercise, we also estimated a stochastic frontier model as suggested independently by Meeusen 
and van den Broeck (1977) and Aigner et al. (1977). Accordingly, they were the first to have 
suggested a ‘composed error model’ for the estimation of cost and production functions, such 
that the specification of the error term consists of the two components: (i) inefficiency and (ii) 
random noise. Hence, in our estimations, the cost inefficiency component uit represents an 
asymmetric term that satisfies uit ≥ 0 but is free without any a priori hypothesis to vary over 
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time. Here, consistent with Aigner et al. (1977) and Coccorese and Pellecchia (2010), it is 
assumed that the impacts uit  are distributed as a positive half-normal random variable N0(0,σu 2).  
 
3.2 Data  
 The cost function is estimated with three inputs and one output. Total operating cost is 
measured by the following: overheads, output (i.e. loans plus other earning assets) and inputs by 
the price of deposits, price of labor and price of capital4. The Lerner index is then computed from 
the price and marginal cost (see Eq. 5). Whereas the latter is calculated from the Translog cost 
function output (see Eq. (4) and Appendix 5), the former is the price charged by financial 
institutions on their output, computed as the ratio between total revenues (interest income plus 
net noninterest income) and total assets.  
 Consistent with recent finance literature (Kusi et al., 2017; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2018; 
Kusi & Opoku‐  Mensah, 2018;  Asongu et al., 2019b), we control for bank-level, market 
oriented and fixed effects.  
Firstly, the bank-level variables include the following. (i) The ratio of loans to total 
assets:  contrary to other bank assets (e.g. securities), lending requires more effort and 
organizational capabilities by the staff. Hence, if not properly performed, it could generate 
inefficiencies. (ii) Deposit to assets ratio: while deposits are the main source of financing for 
banks, they also require good organization to be mobilized and well managed. Therefore, a 
higher fraction of deposits among liabilities could lead to cost inefficiencies. (iii) The number of 
bank branches is also used since widespread branch network entails the creation and 
management of a retail organization which could have a negative (or positive) effect on cost 
efficiency. Whereas we expect negative coefficients for the first-two variables for reasons 
discussed above, the third could have a negative (or positive) effect on CES depending on co-
ordination and organizational problems (or opportunities) linked to a bigger dimension. 
Accordingly, bank branches could also be assimilated to bank size.  
 Secondly, the study also controls for three main market variables, namely: GDP growth, 
population density and inflation. (i) The GDP growth rate is included to take account of the 
influence of business cycle fluctuations on efficiency. For instance, in dynamic and expanding 
markets, banks can benefit from a soaring demand that if exploited, could improve efficiency as 
a result of growing activities in branches and increased networking. In the same vein, while 
                         
4
 The price of deposits is computed by dividing interest expenses by the sum of deposits, money market plus short 
term funding. The price of labor is defined as the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets. The price of capital is 
equal to the ratio of ‘other operating costs’ to the value of fixed assets.  
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exploiting the opportunities for short-run profitability, banks could forgo efficiency. Hence, the 
expected sign cannot be anticipated with certainty. (ii) The sign of population density is also 
ambiguous because, while in markets of high population density it should be less costly to offer 
banking services, dealing with more customers could generate inefficiencies because of issues 
associated with meeting all customers’ requirements. (iii) Theoretically, inflation should increase 
inefficiencies because of risks associated with uncertainties.  
 Thirdly, we further account for fixed effects by controlling for the unobserved 
heterogeneity, namely: ‘legal-origin’ and wealth-effects. (i) The premise for legal origin effects 
builds on the law-finance theory which articulates the relevance of legal origins in financial 
development (La Porta et al., 1998; Beck et al., 2003). Accordingly, English common law is 
more adapted to openness (and competition) and hence should be associated with better 
efficiency scores compared to French civil law. (ii) Intuitively, it is normal to expect higher 
income countries to exhibit higher levels of financial development because a large percentage of 
the monetary base transits through the formal banking sector (Asongu, 2012). Moreover, 
developed financial systems should naturally be associated with a higher degree of competition 
and consequently high cost efficiency.   
The sample consists of a panel of 162 banks consisting of 42 African countries for the 
period 2001-2011. The data is from Bankscope and World Bank Development Indicators 
databases. The summary statistics, correlation matrix (showing the nexuses among key variables 
used in the paper), variables definitions (and corresponding sources), components of competition 
(and efficiency) and estimates of the cost function are presented in Appendix. From the summary 
statistics (Appendix 1) it could be inferred that there is substantial variation in the data utilized 
so that one should be confident that reasonable estimated nexuses would emerge. The purpose of 
the correlation matrix (Appendix 2) is to mitigate issues of multicollinearity. From an initial 
assessment, there are no concerns in terms of the relationships to be modeled.  Results of the cost 
efficiency function are disclosed in Appendix 4. 
 
4. Empirical results  
The findings of the QLH are presented in Table 2. The table consists of two panels. While the 
first (i.e. Panel A) exclusively controls for the unobserved heterogeneity, the second (i.e. Panel 
B) controls for both the unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity in order to better account for 
endogeneity. Hence, in Panel B the Lerner index is instrumented as discussed in Section 3.1.2 
Each panel consists of four main models that are each divided into three specifications. The 
models include: OLS, Fixed Effects, Tobit and Logistic regressions.  
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It is apparent from the findings that market power for the most part is positively 
associated with cost efficiency scores. Hence, based on this positive association, the QLH is 
rejected. Most of the significant control variables display the expected signs.  This established 
finding is not consistent with Asongu and Odhiambo (2019) who have used the same dataset to 
assess whether market power increases the quantity of loans and reduces loan price. They have 
confirmed evidence of the QLH and further asserted that such “quiet life” is driven by the below-
median Lerner index sub-sample. An insight resulting from this comparative analysis is that, 
while market power is associated cost efficiency as established in this research, such cost 
efficiency may not be translated into  an increase in the quantity of loans and a reduction in loan 
price in the African banking industry. This comparative explanation is sound in the light of the 
substantially documented concerns of surplus liquidity prevailing in the African banking industry 
(Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009;  Tchamyou, 2017).  
 
 
               Table 2:  Testing the QLH with the ALS Model (Dependent variable: Cost Efficiency Scores) 
             
 Panel A: Initial regressions with HAC SE (controlling for unobserved heterogeneity) 
 Linear Hypothesis   Nonlinear Hypothesis  
 OLS (Baseline modelling) Fixed Effects Tobit Logistic  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Constant  0.839*** 0.704*** 0.707*** 0.840*** 0.701*** 0.686*** 0.839*** 0.704*** 0.707*** 1.760*** 0.959*** 1.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LERNER 0.016* 0.018* 0.017 0.017** 0.018* 0.019* 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.017** 0.108*** 0.122*** 0.104*** 
 (0.055) (0.078) (0.101) (0.042) (0.063) (0.074) (0.000) (0.009) (0.021) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDPpcg  0.00002*
* 
9.98e-06 −3.2e-05 1.60e-05 2.06e-05 −6.04e-05 2.28e-05 
*** 
9.9e-06* −3.2e-05 9.51e-05 2.74e-05 −0.0004 
 (0.036) (0.526) (0.973) (0.319) (0.345) (0.949) (0.006) (0.095) (0.954) (0.544) (0.807) (0.922) 
Inflation  −0.0004*
** 
−0.0002*
** 
−0.0002*
** 
−0.0004*
** 
−0.0002*
** 
−0.0002*** −0.0004 
*** 
−0.0002*
** 
−0.0002*
** 
−0.003**
* 
−0.001**
* 
−0.001**
* 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
Pop.density --- −3.6e-05 −2.7e-05 --- −3.5e-05 −6.5e-05 --- −3.6e-
05** 
−2.7e-05 --- −0.0002*
* 
−0.0001 
  (0.292) (0.505)  (0.202) (0.101)  (0.041) (0.214)  (0.047) (0.128) 
Loan/A --- 0.286*** 0.300*** --- 0.301*** 0.312*** --- 0.286*** 0.300*** --- 2.029*** 2.115*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Deposits/A --- 0.004 0.012 --- 7.72e-06 0.011 --- 0.004 0.012 --- −0.204**
* 
−0.141 
  (0.856) (0.670)  (0.999) (0.680)  (0.702) (0.412)  (0.000) (0.073) 
Bank Brchs --- --- 0.0001 --- --- 0.001 --- --- 0.0001 --- --- 0.005* 
   (0.907)   (0.255)   (0.761)   (0.071) 
English  --- --- −0.020 na  na na --- --- −0.020**
* 
--- --- −0.194**
* 
   (0.161)      (0.000)   (0.000) 
Middle I. --- --- 0.0002 na  na na --- --- 0.0002 --- --- 0.002 
   (0.984)      (0.963)   (0.952) 
Chi-Square --- --- --- --- --- --- 50.008**
* 
461.366*
** 
470.890*
** 
--- --- --- 
L.likelihood --- --- --- --- --- --- 1034.573 1309.260 1080.081 --- --- --- 
Adj/Within. 
R² 
0.030 0.488 0.494 0.035 0.527 0.538 --- --- --- 0.028 0.516 0.548 
Fisher  9.487*** 22.246**
* 
42.221**
* 
9.377*** 26.437**
* 
61.578*** --- --- --- 9.798*** 157.358*
** 
99.772**
* 
Obs  886 880 748 886 880 748 886 880 748 886 880 748 
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LERNER: Lerner Index. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. Pop.dent: Population density. Loan/A: Loan on Total Assets. Deposit/A: Deposits on 
Total Assets. Bank Brchs: Bank Branches. English: English Common law. Middle I: Middle Income. Adj. R²: Adjusted coefficient of 
determination.  Obs: Observations. ***, **, *: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. IV: 
Instrumental Variable. QLH: Quality of Life of Hypothesis. na: not applicable because the dummy variables cannot be employed in fixed effects 
regressions.  
 
 
5. Concluding implications, caveats and future research directions  
 In this study, we have tested the so-called ‘Quiet Life Hypothesis’ (QLH) which 
postulates that banks with market power are less efficient. We have employed instrumental 
variable Ordinary Least Squares, Fixed Effects, Tobit and Logistic regressions. The empirical 
evidence is based on a panel of 162 banks consisting of 42 African countries for the period 2001-
2011. There is a two-step analytical procedure. First, we have estimated Lerner indices and cost 
efficiency scores. Then, we have regressed cost efficiency scores on Lerner indices contingent on 
bank characteristics, market features and the unobserved heterogeneity. The empirical evidence 
does not support the QLH because market power is positively associated with cost efficiency.
 In the light of the above, firms with higher market power can be putting efforts in 
pursuing cost efficiency. Hence, they may be taking advantage of their position to cut costs. 
Therefore, bank size could contribute to variations in bank margins and spreads (Beck & Hesse, 
2006, p. 1) and the high cost of loans may not necessarily be associated with big banks as 
             
 Panel B: Robustness checks with HAC SE  (controlling for endogeneity) 
 Linear Hypothesis   Nonlinear Hypothesis  
 IV OLS (Baseline modelling) IV Fixed Effects IV Tobit IV Logistic  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Constant  0.845*** 0.663*** 0.671*** 0.849*** 0.659*** 0.649*** 0.845*** 0.663*** 0.671*** 1.767*** 0.597*** 0.705*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IVLERNER 0.004 0.091*** 0.083*** −0.008 0.082*** 0.072*** 0.004 0.091*** 0.083*** 0.082 0.708*** 0.590*** 
 (0.921) (0.001) (0.005) (0.875) (0.004) (0.008) (0.849) (0.000) (0.000) (0.572) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDPpcg  2.2e-
05*** 
1.46e-05 5.05e-05 2.6e-
05** 
2.9e-05** −9.4e-05 2.2e-
05*** 
1.46e-05 
*** 
5.05e-05 0.0001 6.2e-05 −0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.151) (0954) (0.044) (0.047) (0.909) (0.000) (0.004) (0.942) (0.583) (0.627) (0.969) 
Inflation −0.0003*
** 
−0.0002*
** 
−0.0002*
** 
−0.0003*
** 
−0.0002*** −0.0002*
** 
−0.0003
*** 
−0.0002*
** 
−0.0002*
** 
−0.002**
* 
−0.001**
* 
−0.001**
* 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Popden --- −1.9e-05 −2.6e-05 --- −2.8e-05 −5.9e-05 --- −1.9e-05 −2.6e-05 --- −8.6e-05 −0.0001 
  (0.560) (0.531)  (0.318) (0.123)  (0.316) (0.259)  (0.460) (0.223) 
Loan/A --- 0.285*** 0.293*** --- 0.301*** 0.312*** --- 0.285*** 0.293*** --- 2.073*** 2.122*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Deposit/A --- 0.026 0.027 --- 0.027 0.037 --- 0.026* 0.027* --- −0.030 −0.022 
  (0.370) (0.334)  (0.377) (0.195)  (0.059) (0.069)  (0.728) (0.818) 
Bank Brchs --- --- 0.0005 --- --- 0.0009 --- --- 0.0005 --- --- 0.007** 
   (0.671)   (0.246)   (0.313)   (0.028) 
English  --- --- −0.009 na  na na --- --- −0.009* --- --- −0.131**
* 
   (0.508)      (0.083)   (0.001) 
Middle I. --- --- −0.007 na  na na --- --- −0.007 --- --- −0.045 
   (0.593)      (0.182)   (0.264) 
             
Chi-Square --- --- --- --- --- --- 31.411**
* 
419.888*
** 
449.831*
** 
--- --- --- 
L.likelihood --- --- --- --- --- --- 705.401 897.256 743.820 --- --- --- 
Adj/Within. 
R² 
0.017 0.505 0.496 0.022 0.555 0.565 --- --- --- 0.017 0.528 0.533 
Fisher  14.933**
* 
36.632**
* 
52.702**
* 
13.012**
* 
33.480*** 52.792*** --- --- --- 4.290*** 105.458*
** 
62.280**
* 
Obs  563 561 483 563 561 483 563 561 483 563 561 483 
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suggested by Ngigi (2013ab).  Moreover,  these findings are contrary to the literature that has 
confirmed evidence of the QLH, namely:  Casu  and Girardone (2007) with Granger causality 
test in Europe (2000-2005);  Tu  and Chen (2000) in Taiwan (1986-1999) in which results are 
valid only before 1991; Koetter and Vins (2008) for Germany (1996-2006) though the magnitude 
of the estimated effects of the QLH is small; Solis and Maudos (2008) in Mexico (1993-2005) 
for loans market; Delis and Tsionas (2009) for Europe (1996-2006) with the usage of a local 
maximum likelihood technique; Ariss (2010) in a sample of developing countries for cost 
efficiency; Schaeck and Cihak (2008) for Europe and USA (1995-2005) and Coccorese and 
Pellecchia (2010) in Italy (1992-2007) though the impact of market power on efficiency is not of 
a particularly remarkable magnitude. 
 While our findings cannot be directly compared with specific African finance literature 
because scholarship in the area is sparse, they nonetheless run counter to indirect claims 
established in recent literature, notably: Boateng et al. (2018) and Asongu et al. (2016a). Hence, 
because of the positive association between market power and cost efficiency, consolidation of 
banks in the African banking industry may not necessarily reflect negative financial access 
externalities. This is essentially because increasing market power will not necessarily be 
associated with low levels of cost efficiency.  
 An indirect inference worth articulating is the fact that low levels of financial access may 
be the results of other factors which are independent of market power in the African banking 
industry. Accordingly, given that big banks with substantial market power are linked to cost 
efficiency, the surplus liquidity issues and low financial access may be traceable to more 
fundamental factors like information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. These comprise 
(i) adverse selection from banks ex-ante of lending and (ii) moral hazard on the part of 
borrowers, ex-post of lending. Hence it would be worthwhile to investigate how information 
sharing offices (such as public credit registries and private credit bureaus) that are designed to 
reduce such information asymmetry affect the established linkages.  
 In the light of the above, implications of these findings cannot be directly linked to 
financial access because the efficiency found in this study needs to be translated into more 
tangible measures of financial access such as increased loan quantity and reduced loan price. 
Unfortunately, given that Asongu and Odhiambo (2019) have confirmed evidence of the QLH in 
terms of reduced loan quantity and increased loan price, it further implies that banks need to 
develop other strategies through which cost reduction can be translated into higher quantity of 
loans and reduced loan price. This policy implication builds on the fact that the comparative 
study has used the same dataset as in this study.  In essence, this comparative emphasis only 
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confirms previously discussed policy implications suggesting the need for bank-specific policies 
that enhance financial intermediation (i.e. the transformation of mobilized deposits into credit) to 
be complemented with macroeconomic government-led initiatives that facilitate financial access, 
inter alia; policies designed to reduce information asymmetry and collateral (i.e. credit 
guarantee) constraints during in the process to granting credit to households and economic 
operators.  
 It is also worthwhile to articulate that owing to the problem of endogeneity which is 
partly addressed in the estimation process (i.e. by controlling for simultaneity and the 
unobserved heterogeneity), the relationship between market power and efficiency is not 
causative but associative. Moreover, high heterogeneity in the sample (especially, with respect to 
the few number of banks per country) also supports the cautionary conclusion that the main 
finding should be understood as a relationship and not causation. Future research can focus on 
assessing if the established interconnections could withstand empirical scrutiny within country-
specific settings. Moreover, investigating if market power affects financial intermediation 
efficiency through ‘economies of scale’ is also worthwhile in order to improve the extant 
literature.  
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics  
       
  Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Observations 
       
 
Translog 
cost 
function 
variables 
Ln. Cost (C) 2.982 1.292 0.155 5.749 1032 
Ln. Output (Q) 3.780 1.332 0.505 6.469 1060 
Deposit Price (W1) 0.539 8.196 0.000 176.00 1031 
Labour Price (W2) 0.022 0.016 0.000 0.201 961 
Capital Price (W3) 1.733 3.884 0.000 72.750 1043 
       
Market 
variables  
GDP per capita growth 13.912 96.707 -15.306 926.61 1782 
Inflation  10.239 22.695 -9.823 325.00 1749 
Population density  81.098 106.06 2.085 633.52 1782 
       
 
Bank level 
variables  
Loan/Assets  0.449 0.183 0.000 0.966 1092 
Deposits/Assets  0.664 0.198 0.000 1.154 1052 
Bank Branches  6.112 6.158 0.383 37.209 1129 
Output Price (P) 0.338 0.929 0.000 25.931 1045 
       
 
Fixed 
effects 
variables  
English  0.617 0.486 0.000 1.000 1782 
French  0.382 0.486 0.000 1.000 1782 
Low Income  0.462 0.498 0.000 1.000 1782 
Middle Income  0.537 0.498 0.000 1.000 1782 
       
Ln: Logarithm. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. S.D: Standard Deviation  
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Appendix 2: Correlation Matrix (uniform sample size 748) 
             
Lerner  GDPpcg Infl. Popden L/A D/A B.Brchs English French Low I Middle I CE  
1.000 0.022 0.008 -0.019 -0.016 0.013 0.037 -0.141 0.141 -0.105 0.105 0.136 Lerner 
 1.000 -0.059 0.028 -0.193 0.008 -0.069 -0.081 0.081 -0.029 0.029 -0.120 GDPpcg 
  1.000 -0.056 -0.086 0.073 -0.010 -0.097 0.097 -0.005 0.005 -0.122 Infl. 
   1.000 -0.019 0.132 0.434 0.257 -0.257 -0.054 0.054 -0.075 Popden 
    1.000 -0.229 0.124 0.164 -0.164 -0.010 0.010 0.676 L/A 
     1.000 0.010 0.018 -0.018 0.199 -0.199 -0.143 D/A 
      1.000 -0.078 0.078 -0.454 0.454 0.093 B.Brchs 
       1.000 -1.000 0.230 -0.230 -0.020 English 
        1.000 -0.230 0.230 0.020 French 
         1.000 -1.000 -0.045 Low I 
          1.000 0.045 Middle I 
           1.000 CE 
             
Lerner: Lerner index. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. Popden: Population density. L/A: Loan on Total Assets. D/A: Deposit on Total Assets. B. 
Brchs: Bank Branches. English: English Common law countries. French: French Civil law countries. Low I: Low Income. Middle I: Middle 
Income.  
 
 
Appendix 3: Definitions of variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables Sources 
    
Marginal Cost  MC The change in Total cost arising from a change in 
Output by one unit.  
Translog Cost Function 
    
Price  (charged on Output) P (Gross Interest and Dividend income +Total Non-
Interest Operating Income)/Output 
BankScope 
    
Lerner Index  Lerner Firm’s market power ((P-MC)/P) Authors’ calculation 
    
Cost Efficiency Scores  CE The distance between the observed cost and 
minimum cost on the frontier.  
Prediction from Translog 
Cost Function 
    
Cost  C Total Operating Cost (Overheads) + Total interest 
expenses  
BankScope 
    
Output  Q Loans + other earning assets BankScope 
    
Deposit Price W1 Total Interest Expense/Total Deposits, Money Market 
and Short-term Funding 
BankScope 
    
Labour Price W2 Personnel Expenses on Total Assets  BankScope 
    
Capital Price  W3 Other Operating Expenses on Fixed Assets  BankScope 
    
GDP per capita  GDPpcg GDP per capita growth (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Inflation  Infl. Consumer Price Index (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Populaton density  Popden People per square kilometers of land area WDI (World Bank) 
    
Loans/Assets  L/A Loans on Total Assets  BankScope 
    
Deposits/Assets  D/A Deposits  on Total Assets  BankScope 
    
Bank Branches  B. Brchs Number of Bank Branches (Commercial bank 
branches per 100 000 adults) 
BankScope 
    
English  Common law English English Common Law Countries  La Porta et al. (2008, p.289) 
    
French  Civil law  French French  Civil law  Countries  La Porta et al. (2008, p.289) 
    
Low Income  Low I Low Income Countries  FDSD (World Bank) 
    
Middle Income  Middle I Middle Income Countries  FDSD (World Bank) 
    
WDI: World Development Indicators. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
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Appendix 4: Estimates of the Cost Function (Aigner–Lovell–Schmidt) 
    
Parameters Regressors Coefficients Standard 
Errors 
0  Constant 1.295*** 0.228 
Q  ln Q 0.712*** 0.046 
1  1lnW  -0.249** 0.125 
2  2ln W  1.559*** 0.186 
3  3lnW  0.208* 0.116 
QQ    2ln 2Q  0.041*** 0.008 
11    2ln 21W  -0.174*** 0.046 
22    2ln 22W  0.514*** 0.090 
33    2ln 23W  -0.190*** 0.061 
1Q  1lnln WQ  -0.015 0.015 
12  21 lnln WW   -0.044 0.064 
13  31 lnln WW   -0.074 0.051 
2Q  2lnln WQ  -0.039** 0.018 
23  32 lnln WW   -0.008 0.057 
3Q  3lnln WQ  -0.001 0.014 
   
Log-likelihood 189.22656 
Wald Chi-square 32941.90*** 
Observations 892 
Banks 162 
    
***, **,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
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